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Abstract1 
 
The aim of the paper is to unbundle the main economic variables in-
volved in the European Crisis and clarify their reciprocal relation-
ship. The variables considered are: unemployment, inflation, con-
sumptions, investments and current accounts. We use annual, quar-
terly and monthly data, until 2012, mid-2013 or an estimate of 2013 
for the main European countries. The main results are the following: 
a) we show an emerging European economic divide, b) we detect a 
quasi-Okun relationship between investment and unemployment, c) 
we show the revival of the Phillips curve, especially in Germany, d) 
we test for the relationship between unemployment and the Govern-
ment deficit, e) we show the existence of a relationship between un-
employment and current account, f) we show how countries with 
high unemployment rate could bear the burden, g) we unbundle the 
unemployment-current account relationship, showing first the rela-
tionship between unemployment and final consumption, h) and then 
between final consumption, imports and current account, i) we show 
why a stable and growing inflation differential is not sustainable, but 
argue that internal devalution is not an effective policy, pushing in-
flation rates to a worrisome lower level and even outright deflation, 
l) we argue and show how to implement a more effective policy 
looking to the inflation differentials of specific products, looking to 
the case of Italy, m) we analyze the trade relationship between Ger-
many and China, arguing that since the onset of the EMU and the 
successive membership of China to the WTO, a European structural 
break occurred, with some European countries relying much more on 
exports rather than domestic demand. A more general issue of sus-
tainability and replicability of the Germany’s export led growth 
model is raised. 
 
                                                     
1 This paper is part of a research project on the Economic crisis, financed by the 
Catholic University (D.3.2) 2012. 
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Introduction 
 
The Great Recession, stemming from the US, prompted a Sovereign 
Debt Crisis in the European economies and brought about a double-
dip recession, in 2009 and 2012-2013, and therefore a Great Europe-
an Recession: country inflation rates converged while unemployment 
diverged, public debt/GDP ratio surged as a consequence of the GDP 
sharp fall, especially in the Southern European countries. The fiscal 
measures implemented in the crisis countries of the Euro Area, since 
2010, were aimed at two goals: reducing the public debt/GDP ratio 
and the current account deficit. The two objectives have been pur-
sued with two instruments: fiscal measures to reduce public deficit, 
by taxes increases and public spending reductions, and internal de-
valutation, with the purpose of reducing real exchange misalignment 
and improve competitiveness.   The instruments proved successful in 
turning positive the current account deficits curtailing domestic de-
mand, however at the cost of a steep increase of unemployment rate 
together with a sharp decline of the inflation rate, well below the 
ECB target. The austerity has revived an inflation-unemployment re-
lationship which resemble the Phillips’ curve, however driven by a 
sudden and lasting excess supply in the goods market, and as a con-
sequence in the labor market. 
 
1. The theoretical framework 
 
We focus our analysis on the relationships between five key endoge-
nous variables - consumption, investments, unemployment, inflation 
and current account - for the main countries of Euro Area.  The ex-
ogenous variables are the instruments, fiscal policy and internal de-
valutation, aimed at the two goals of public and current account defi-
cits.  The following picture   shows the chain of relationships  on 
which we will center our analysis. 
 
 
  
 
8 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Within the Euro Area the traditional Tinbergen target-instrument ap-
proach needs to be supplemented by a Hurwicz decentralized mech-
anism, which is better suited to highlights the decentralized econom-
ic imbalances arising from different countries’ fundamentals and de-
cision processes. Indeed the Great European Recession brought 
about new patterns of behavior and, notably, the comeback of eco-
nomic divergence. It should be noticed that unemployment is not a 
primary goal of Euro Area or the European Union and the European 
Central Bank has instead inflation as a primary goal, in spite of the 
fact that unemployment  is a strong predictor of all the aggregate var-
iables we consider, not to mention its fundamental social value. In 
fact European economies had to address the well-known problem of 
achieving simultanously internal and external balance, with common 
instruments and goals but quite different economic fundamentals for 
each country.  
Our purpose is to unbundle the main economic relationships among 
five key endogenous aggregates, and their relationship with the un-
employment rate, to understand causes and consequences of the Eu-
ropean Crisis. We will therefore analyze each one of the connections 
among the macroeconomic variables, in aggregate and for the main 
countries. 
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Figure 2 
 


2. Economic policy and democracy 
 
The Great European Recession arose new and unexpected problems 
of democratic consensus, because the implementation of fiscal and 
internal devalution policies caused a double-dip recession in the 
countries in which the public deficit and the current account deficit 
was highest: the main European institutions, like the European Cen-
tral Bank and the European Commission, came to the forefront of the 
political debate. The issue of democratic consensus was compounded 
by the asymmetry of the economic burden in terms of unemployment 
and standard of living, without a broad political consensus. 
The political economy problem in terms of democratic consensus can 
be better appreciated by looking to the absolute change of the Gross 
Domestic Product for each country (we exclude Croatia because it 
entered the European Union since January 2012), together with their 
population, as shown in table 1, where countries were ranked in as-
cending order. 
 
 
Final 
Consumption 
Unemployment 
Inflation 
Investment 
Imports and 
Current Account 
  
 
10
 
 
Table 1 -  GDP 2012-2008 (chain-linked) 
Country GDP millions (-)
population
2012 
(000) 
Country GDP millions (+)
population
2012 
(000) 
Italy -86.369 60.821 Estonia 42 1.334
Spain -54.873 46.818 Malta 166 418
United 
Kingdom -47.210 63.495 Slovakia 1.985 5.404
Greece -41.925 11.123 Belgium 3.493 11.095
Netherlands -14.059 16.730 Austria 4.092 8.408
Ireland -9.218 4.583 France 9.614 65.328
Portugal -8.688 10.542 Sweden 16.404 9.483
Denmark -7.953 5.581 Poland 36.369 38.538
Finland -6.404 5.401 Germany 63.840 81.844
Hungary -5.494 9.932       
Romania -4.919 20.096       
Slovenia -2.862 2.055       
Czech 
Republic -1.693 10.505       
Latvia -1.535 2.045       
Lithuania -1.251 3.004       
Bulgaria -730 7.327       
Cyprus -392 862       
Luxembourg -318 525       
Total (-) -295.891 281.446 Total (+) 136.005 221.851
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
These data show that the Great Recession and the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis hit unevenly European countries: the countries with a GDP de-
crease totalled 56% of the European Union population and recorded 
a decrease of -296 billion of GDP, while the countries with a GDP 
increase totalled 44% of the EU population, recording an increase of 
136 billions. In other words the European economic policy brought 
  
 
11
about 2,1 euro of GDP loss in 18 countries for 1 euro of GDP gain in 
9 countries: as a result the GDP gap widened. Italy, Spain, U.K. and 
Greece recorded the highest (absolute) decrease of GDP, while Ger-
many, Poland, Sweden and France recorded the highest increase. Be-
cause the economic policy instruments, namely monetary policy and 
to a large extent also the fiscal policy, are at European level, some 
form of cost-benefit analysis, and potential redistribution of the 
common benefits, should have been expected. The loose coordina-
tion of the economic policies for the common benefit entails the risk 
of a drop of democratic consensus for the European project. 
 
3. Final Consumption and Investments 
 
The European crisis has been, to a large extent, a domestic crisis: if 
we sum Final Consumption to Gross Fixed Capital Formation (i.e. 
Gross Fixed Investments) it is possible to rank countries in relation 
to this crucial domestic aggregate. Not surprisingly, the countries 
which recorded the highest (absolute) decrease of GDP were Spain, 
Italy, Greece and UK, while the countries with the highest increase 
were Germany, Poland, France and Germany. The comparison of ta-
ble 1 and 2 shows, implicitly, that the fall of domestic demand was 
the driving force behind the (second) recession: while the first reces-
sion (in 2009) hit alike all European countries the second was the 
consequence of fiscal consolidation and internal devalutation, and hit 
unevenly the European countries.  In this case the gap between the 
decreasing and increasing countries was wider: the decreasing coun-
tries totalled 56% of the European Union population and a value of -
507 billions, while the increasing countries totalled 44% of popula-
tion and an increase of +146 billions, which means a loss of 3,5 euro 
for 1 dollar gain.  
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Table 2 - UE Country 2012-2008 
(Final Consumption + Gross Fixed Capital Formation) 
Country 
Consumption 
+ Fixed In-
vestments 
millions (-) 
population 
2012 
(000) 
countries 
Consumption 
+ Fixed In-
vestments 
millions (+) 
population 
2012 
(000) 
Spain -132.593 46.818 Finland 633 5.401
Italy -111.000 60.821 Luxembourg 1.032 525
Greece -64.688 11.123 Belgium 3.593 11.095
U.K. -62.897 63.495 Austria 6.860 8.408
Ireland -30.524 4.583 Sweden 16.147 9.483
Netherlands -23.827 16.730 France 19.307 65.328
Portugal -21.985 10.542 Poland 22.406 38.538
Romania -12.985 20.096 Germany 76.103 81.844
Hungary -11.095 9.932       
Denmark -8.863 5.581       
Czech Rep. -5.100 10.505       
Slovenia -4.699 2.055       
Lithuania -4.289 3.004       
Bulgaria -4.288 7.327       
Latvia -2.906 2.045       
Cyprus -1.968 862       
Slovakia -1.744 5.404       
Estonia -1.212 1.334       
Malta -37 418       
Total (-) -506.700 282.675 Total (+) 146.079 220.622
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database – (chain linked) 
 
The distinction between Final Consumption and Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation – Investment for brief - rises the question of the relation-
ship between the two aggregates: according to our approach a fall of 
Final Consumption should be the the cause of a corresponding fall of 
investments. A cross-section relationship is compatible with this di-
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rection of causality: to reduce the possible collinearity between con-
sumption and investments we take the rate of changes of the two var-
iables, from 2008 to 2012, assuming that the direction of causality 
goes from the consumption to the investment. The cross-section rela-
tionship is defined as: 
 
     (1) 
 
 
The plot shows a positive fit: an increase of (chain- linked) final con-
sumption is associated to an increase of investment for the European 
Union countries (figure 3). 
A increasing demand can also come from abroad, balancing the fall 
of the domestic demand: to check this aspect we take the EU (27) 
export increase, from 2008 to 2012, and compute the share of the to-
tal increase for each country. The result is that, over the period, the 
bulk of the increase (42%) is concentrated in Germany, followed by 
The Netherland (13%): therefore export demand played a significant 
role only for these two countries. Exports has been concentrated in 
Germany and The Netherland, which are the main channels of spill-
overs on the other European countries. 
 
̇ =  +  ∗ ̇ 
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To analyze the relationship between investments and unemployment 
rate we posit the following (quasi-Okun) relationship, measured on 
quarterly data, from 2006Q1 to 2013Q2 for the European Union 
(27): 
 
  (2) 
 
 
 
A percentage reduction of investment at quarter t, against quarter (t-
4), for example -15,1%, causes an increase of the unemployment 
rate, equal to (Ut – Ut-4)=2 points over a year. The quasi-Okun rela-
tioship holds quite well for many countries, like Spain, Portugal, Ire-
land, Poland, Germany, France and Italy. It should not come as a 
surprise that over this period also a normal Okun relationship holds, 
with the quarter GDP annual change, both for European Union (27) 
and the Euro Area (17), and – in some cases in a weaker form – for 
the above countries. 
 
4. Double-dip recession in Europe and the German Phillips 
curve 
 
Economic convergence is the main goal of the European project, be-
cause it is a socially valuable outcome and its achievement should 
allow a closer political integration: however a crucial and perhaps 
unexpected problem of the Great Recession has been a widening of 
the economic and social gaps.  In fact if we look to the period 2009-
2013, we can check a steady increase of the unemployement rate for 
almost all the European countries, while the inflation rate plunged to 
a low in 2009 and, again, decreased sharply in 2012. A diverging 
pattern emerged within the European Union countries (27): the vari-
ability of the monthly inflation rates, year-on-year, decreased (meas-
	 − 	
 =   
   
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ured by the standard deviation) while the unemployment (measured 
monthly) steadily increased (figure 5). 
The Great European Recession has also revived the Phillips curve, 
the empirical regularity between money wages changes and unem-
ployment rate discovered by Phillips (1958), which was given a theo-
retical foundation by Lipsey (1960) and generalization by Samuelson 
and Solow (1960) in the form of a short run relationship between in-
flation and unemployment rate, with an explicit account for expecta-
tions in the long run. They suggested also the possibility of “histere-
sis”, and, looking to the long run, they argued that “the level of at-
tained growth will be highly correlated with the degree of full em-
ployment and high-capacity output”. This insight is close to “Okun 
law” (1962) analysis of the “Potential GNP” and its relationship with 
the unemployment rate, which also we proved to be still valid, in re-
lation with investment.  
We first analyze the inflation-unemployment relationship during the 
Great Recession (2009-2012) and then, in the following section, we 
focus on the period after the fiscal consolidation policies, started in 
late 2011.  
In the longer run (2009-2012) the inflation-unemployment relation-
ship does not exhibit a Phillips behavior: rather it characterizes a 
double-dip recession, the first in 2009 following the sudden stop af-
ter the Lehman default and the second as the consequence on unem-
ployment and inflation of the fiscal consolidation.  Figure 6 shows 
the dynamic of  inflation, as a function of unemployment, from Janu-
ary 2009 to September 2013, for the countries of the European Union 
(27): the best polynomial interpolation is clearly non-linear and of 
higher order of the one shown in the figure. The aggregate douple-
dip recession is therefore a mixture of different patterns: Spain, Por-
tugal, Netherland and Bulgaria are better interpolated by a double-
dip pattern, while Italy shows a quadratic and Ireland an inverse 
quadratic pattern (see Appendix A for a detailed account).  
The crucial exception is Germany where a well-defined Phillips 
curve arises, with the correct inverse clockwise pattern (figure 7): in 
2009 welfare state automatic stabilizers (Campiglio, 2013) helped 
Germany to smooth the economic impact of the crisis and from 2010 
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onwards unemployment rate gradually reduced, until 5.7% in Octo-
ber 2011 while inflation increased to 2.9%. From October 2011 to 
September 2013 unemployment rate fell further to 5.2% and, contra-
ry to Phillips normal pattern, inflation decreased furthermore to 
1.1%.  Indeed, the Phillips curve seems to be a still relevant relation-
ship for the Germany economy, with some appropriate qualifications 
(Quaas and Klein, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
 
 
 
 
0,0
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
European Union (27) Inflation and Unemployment 
 Standard Deviation 2009.1-2013.6  
Inflation EU(27) (S.D.) Unemployment EU (27) (S.D.)
  
 
19
 
Fi
gu
re
 6
 
 
 
 
So
ur
ce
: A
ut
ho
r’
s c
al
cu
la
tio
n 
fr
om
 E
ur
os
ta
t d
at
ab
as
e 
 
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
09
 
Se
pt
em
be
r 2
01
3 
0,
0
0,
5
1,
0
1,
5
2,
0
2,
5
3,
0
3,
5
4,
0
8,
0
8,
5
9,
0
9,
5
10
,0
10
,5
11
,0
11
,5
Inflation yoy 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
- m
on
th
ly
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
 (2
7)
: I
nf
la
tio
n-
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
09
-S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
01
3 
(5
7 
m
on
th
s)
 
  
 
20
 
Fi
gu
re
 7
 
 
 
 
So
ur
ce
: A
ut
ho
r’
s c
al
cu
la
tio
n 
fr
om
 E
ur
os
ta
t d
at
ab
as
e 
  
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
09
 Ju
ly
 2
00
9 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
1 
Se
pt
em
be
r 2
01
3 
y 
= 
-0
,6
28
4x
2  +
 7
,5
05
9x
 - 
20
,1
76
 
R²
 =
 0
,8
61
1 
-1
,0
-0
,50,
0
0,
5
1,
0
1,
5
2,
0
2,
5
3,
0
3,
5
5,
0
5,
5
6,
0
6,
5
7,
0
7,
5
8,
0
8,
5
Inflation yoy 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t -
 m
on
th
ly
 
Ge
rm
an
y:
 In
fla
tio
n-
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
09
-S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
01
3 
(5
7 
m
on
th
s)
 
  
 
21
5. Phillips curve and fiscal consolidation 
 
The Sovereign Debt Crisis triggered the European economic crisis 
when the Greek crisis, acting as a Black Swan, revived the risk pre-
mium of Euro Area countries against the German financial assets: in 
April 2010 Greek public debt was downgraded to the level of junk-
bonds and a bailout loan by the IMF was granted, conditional on 
measures of economic austerity. The financial market turmoil spread 
from Greece to all the Souther European countries, becoming a sys-
temic crisis and reached a common turning point on October 2011. In 
October 2011 Moody’s announced, and then made official, a rating 
downgrade of France; in Italy a new government was set up, while in 
Portugal bonds risk premium was on the rise and the ECB reduced 
the interest rate. If we look more closely to this period, selecting the 
dates closest to the relevant turning points (Bellavite Pellegrini, Meo-
li, Pellegrini, Urga - 2013), a Phillips curve, stemming from the 
goods market, can be identified. 
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In figure 8 and 9 we identify the inflation-unemployment relation-
ship, on a monthly basis, since April 2011 until September 2013 for 
the Euro Area (17) and the European Union (27), while in the Ap-
pendix B we make the same for the main countries. The estimate is 
of the form: 
 
     (3a) 
 
     (3b) 
 
where U is the unemployment rate and   is the rate of inflation 
(HICP) year on year on a monthly basis (Price Index (t)/Price Index 
(t-12) – 1)*100. 
 
The inflation-unemployment relationship is confirmed, with both the 
analytical specifications, and the following qualifications: 
 
1. the non-linear negative relationship between inflation and un-
employment, both for the Euro Area and the European Union, 
suggests a close interconnection and contagion, from the Euro 
Area to the European Union. 
2. The inflation-unemployment relationship, unlike the traditional 
Phillips Curve, stems directly from the goods market – rather 
than the labor market – and the falling inflation is the conse-
quence of the fiscal consolidation and the ensuing fall of dispos-
able income and consumption. 
3. from the Appendix B we can check the differences between the 
European countries: the relationship is linear in Greece since 
August 2010, as well as France, Portugal, Cyprus since October 
2011; it is quadratic in Italy since October 2011 and in Spain 
since October 2012. In Germany and Ireland the relation be-
tween inflation and unemployment is instead positive since Oc-
tober 2011, with a time decreasing unemployment associated 
with a simultaneous decreas of inflation. 
̇	 =  −  ∗ 	  
̇	 =  +   ∗ 	 −  ∗ 	  
̇	
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4. the traditional Phillips curve exhibits counterclockwise loops 
and, with the Samuelson-Solow extension, this should mean an 
increasing inflation when unemployment decrease and a slower 
inflation when unemployment increses. We do not observe clear 
loops for Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and France but rather a line-
ar relationship, probably because of the short period considered: 
it is hower the direction one would expect in a depressed econ-
omy. In Italy we see a half-loop but on the opposite side. In 
Germany and Ireland we find a remarkable inverse relationship, 
with inflation and unemployment rates moving in the same di-
rection. In the case of Spain the relationship hold only for the 
period October 2012-September 2013: for a better understand-
ing we need to revert to the previous longer time-span. 
 
The original Phillips curve relates money wage changes to the unem-
ployment rate, and therefore its dynamic is driven by the labor mar-
ket and the demand-supply relationship: Samuelson and Solow ex-
tension relates price changes to the unemployment rate, and as a con-
sequence its dynamic is instead driven by the good market and its 
demand-supply relationship. Samuelson and Solow hypothesis be-
comes relevant within the Clower’s insight (1965) about the “dual 
decision hypothesis”: in other words, as a genereral rule people in-
crease their labor supply “because” they would like to consume 
more. Generalizing both hypothesis we can argue that the Phillips 
curve should be reinterpreted as a binding constraint on households’ 
planned expenditures, when disposable income falls below a critical 
level: when real disposable income declines, because of higher taxes, 
consumption in the market for goods declines and so the demand for 
labor by the firms. Steadily increasing unemployment reduces 
households’ disposable income and their consumption, causing over-
capacity, slower price increases and, in some cases, an absolute de-
cline. 
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6. Unemployment, public debt and deficit   
 
The sharp GDP decline caused by the Great Recession increased au-
tomatically the Public Debt/GDP ratio: as a major example it is use-
ful to look at the unfolding of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Italy (fig-
ure 10). In 2007 befor the onset of the Great Recession the Public 
Debt/GDP ratio was 103,3: between 2007 and 2012 the nominal 
GDP increased a meagre 0,8%, while the public debt continued to 
grow on its trend, increasing 23,9%, and the Public Debt/GDP ratio 
increased +23% (as a matter of arithmetic). As a counterfactual we 
can ask which the Public Debt/GDP ratio would have been, should 
the nominal GDP had grown on its trend since 1999: to make the ex-
ercise we simply made a linear interpolation from 1999 to 2007 
(R2=0,996) and projected the estimate to the years 2008-2012. Fig-
ure 11 shows what the Public Debt/GDP ratio would have been, 
should the nominal GDP had grown on its trend: the difference from 
2008 to 2012 is obviously related to the output gap, a crucial eco-
nomic concept for the economic policy, whose estimate is however 
subject to a wide margin of uncertainty (the 8 points increase of the 
Debt/GDP ratio is a measure of the structural problem related to a 
potential GDP growing too slow).  
The Public Debt/GDP ratio has been a primary goal of economic pol-
icy in all the European countries, however achieved only in Sweden, 
where also unemployment rate fell: Sweden is the only country in 
Europe to achieve both goals. For all the other European countries 
the results are mixed: with the exception of Hungary, the public 
debt/GDP ratio increased everywhere, but unemployment rate de-
creased in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, 
Sweden, Finland and Malta (figure 12). The counterpart of this pat-
tern is a close relationship between the level of government defi-
cit/GDP in 2012 and the change of  unemployment rate between 
from 2009 to 2012 (figure 13 - positive values for the deficit). In 
2012 all the European countries recorded a government deficit, with 
the exception of Germany: in 2012, 16 countries recorded a deficit 
above the 3% of the GDP, and for 14 countries the unemployment 
rate was above 10%. 
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Figure 10 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
Figure 11 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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7. Unemployment and Current Account 
 
In the US the current account of each single State is not binding for 
the whole country, while instead it is a constraint for each country of 
the European Union and the Euro Area: in Europe there are bounda-
ries of power, functions and responsabilities unknown in the US. The 
question is entangled, because the current account of the Euro Area, 
as a whole, has a direct impact on the euro exchange rate with the 
other major currencies and influences the competitiveness of each 
countries: at the same time the current account of the Euro Area can 
be positive while for many countries can be steadily in deficit, rais-
ing increasing doubts on the capacity to repay foreign debts, either 
denominated in euro or other strong currencies. This aspect is clearly 
at variance with what happens in the US.  
Assuming exports are exogenous (the small country hypothesis ap-
plies) for each country, the unemployment rate (U) drives the final 
consumption (FC), imports decrease and the current account (CA): 
then we should find out a composite function relating the unem-
ployment rate to the current account through the final consumption, 
via imports, i.e.: 
 
     (4) 
 
because: 
 
 .   (5) 
 
given: 
 
    (6) 
 
and 
 
   (7) 
 
 = ()  
.  = ()
  =  − 
  = ℎ()
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First of all we check wheter the final relationship (4) holds, over the 
period 2009Q1-2013Q2, on the basis of quarterly data. For the Euro-
pean Union (27) a positive relationship arises: the zero balance of  
the current account is however associated with a high level of unem-
ployment (around 9%). This is happened however in Greece, Portu-
gal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland, during the Great Recession: the unem-
ployment rate associated to zero balance is quite low in  Netherland 
while in Germany no relationship arises. 
 
 
Figure 14 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
 
8. Unemployment and Current Account in the longer run  
 
The question arises whether the relationship between unemployment 
and current account, analyzed since the Great Recession, can be gen-
eralized to the long term, since the inception of the Euro: the answer 
is affirmative, allowing further insights on the pattern of the current 
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adjustment. For the European Union the relationship between unem-
ployment and current account, from 1999 to 2012, is the following 
(figure 15):  
The relationship for the European Union (27) measured on annual 
data is similar to that computed on quarterly data: the unemployment 
rate associated to the zero balance of the current account is only 
slightly lower, 8,5%; the linear fit is good but without no clear time 
pattern. 
However, if we consider the main European countries a number of 
interesting patterns arise. In Greece, Portugal, Spain the current ac-
count balance has been negative since 1999: in all the three countries 
there was however a sharp improvement in 2012, starting with 2009. 
The drawback is that the improvement was the result of a dramatic 
increase of the unemployment rate, reaching 25% for Greece and 
Spain and 16% in Portugal. Ireland and Italy have recorded a similar 
pattern. In Ireland the current account balance in 1999 was positive, 
became moderately negative in 2005 and plunged in 2009, with an 
immediate recovery in 2010, and a an increasingly positive balance 
since then. In Italy the current account balance started positive in 
1999, hovered around zero balance until 2005, became negative from 
2008 to 2011, while recovering close the zero balance in 2012. In Ita-
ly and Ireland, however, the adjustement process was prompted by 
an increase of unemployment to more than 10% in Italy and 15% in 
Ireland. In the case of Italy a counterclok loop also appears. The case 
of  The Netherlands is interesting because this country shows a ro-
bust positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
current account: however the current account balance is always posi-
tive and the unemployment rate is lowest in 2001 (2,5%) and highest 
in 2012 (9,4%). For Germany, France and Sweden the relationship 
between unemployment and current account show no clear pattern, 
and in the following section we suggest an explanation based on the 
effectiveness of the schemes of unemployment insurance and, more 
generally, of the welfare system. 
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9. Unemployment and social insurance 
 
The high level of unemployment rate caused by the fiscal measures 
in many European countries, the sizable amount of wasted potential 
output and employment ask the question of their social sustainability: 
for a better understanding we need to take in account the role of so-
cial protection benefits provided as an insurance against unemploy-
ment. If we consider the most recent data available – for the year 
2011 – we can make a comparison of the unemployment rate with 
the unemployment benefits for the small set of countries on which 
we draw more attention (table 3). The highest unemployment rate in 
Spain (21,7%) is associated with the highest share of unemployment 
benefits (as % of GDP), as well as in the case of Greece and Ireland, 
where a high unemployment rate is associated with a higher share of  
unemployment benefits. Ireland stands out as the country with the 
highest value of euro per inhabitant, followed by Spain, Denmark 
and France. Italy is the country with the lowest level of unemploy-
ment benefits (as a share of GDP), which can be accounted by two 
main reasons: the high level of shadow economy (21,6% of GDP in 
2012)2 and the highest share of zero of enterprises of class zero (i.e. 
no paid employee) in Europe3 (table 2), which include a high share 
of quasi-employee, for which the unemployment measurement is 
meaningless. 
 
                                                     
2 The estimate of the shadow economy (2012) are 24% in Greece, 19,2% in Spain 
and 12,7% in Ireland. “Shadow Economy and Undeclared Work”, European Com-
mission,  
3  European Commission (2011) “Key figures on European business, with a special 
feature” Eurostat, p. 19 and statistical annexes 
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Table 3 
 
Country/Time 
Unemployment
 rate 
Unemployment 
benefits  - % 
GDP 
Euro per 
inhabitant 
(constant 2005 
prices) 
Total Social 
 protection bene-
fits - % 
GDP  
GEO/TIME 2011 
Denmark 7,6 1,8 685 32,8
Germany 5,9 1,3 386 28,3
Ireland 14,7 3,3 1.166 28,3
Greece 17,7 2,1 334 28,9
Spain 21,7 3,7 732 25,6
France 9,6 2,1 588 31,9
Italy 8,4 0,8 187 28,4
Cyprus 7,9 1,2 219 22,4
Netherlands 4,4 1,5 482 30,5
Portugal 12,9 1,4 201 25
Sweden 7,8 1,2 410 29
          
European Union (27) 9,7 1,6 361 27,8
Euro area (17) 10,1 1,8 468 28,8
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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10. Unemployment and Final Consumption Expenditures 
 
In this section we focus on the relationship between unemployment 
and final consumption expenditure, as previously defined: 
 
            (7’)  
 
Final consumption expenditures is the sum of three main aggregates: 
the final consumption expenditures of households, the final con-
sumption expenditures of the government and the NPISH (Non Profit 
Institutions Serving Households). Focusing on the interaction of 
households’ final consumption  and government consumption we can 
divide European countries in three categories, over the 2012-2008 
period: 
a) Countries where both household and government consumption 
expenditures declined: they were Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ire-
land, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Portugal (11) 
b) countries where both household and government expenditures 
increased: they were Belgium, Germany, France Luxembourg, 
Malta, Austria, Poland, Finland, Sweden (9) 
c) countries where the decrease of household consumption was 
matched by a (lower) government increase, and as a conse-
quence a decrease of Final Consumption: they were Denmark, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Netherland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
United Kindom. (8) 
 
Therefore the Final Consumption (private and public) decreased in 
19 countries, while increased in 8 countries: final consumption of 
households is around 70% of total Final Consumption in the Europe-
an Union and therefore it is also the main culprit of the consumption 
slump in the period, causing a corresponding output and employment 
reduction. The slump in the 19 countries was the consequence of the 
fiscal austerity which reduced households’ disposable income, and in 
11 countries also the final consumption of the government. In the fol-
   = ℎ()
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lowing we focus on the main aggregate of the Final Consumption in 
total. 
We consider first the unemployment-final consumption relationship 
for the Euro Area (17), over the period 2009Q1-2013Q2, to analyze 
its evolution during the Great European Crisis. From the second 
quarter 2010 the unemployment rate in the Euro Area recorded a de-
cline until the second quarter 2011: the fourth quarter 2011 marks the 
first impact of the fiscal austerity on the rate of change of the Final 
Consumption (over the corresponding quarter 2010) which started to 
decline while the unemployment rate was again on the rise. The best 
fit is still a non- linear double-dip: we gain a much better understand-
ing of the process looking to the crisis-ridden countries. The fit is 
linear negative, and improved, if we select Italy (since 2009Q1), 
Spain (since 2009Q4), Portugal (since 2009Q1), Cyprus (since 
2009Q4), Netherlands (since 2009Q1): again Ireland shows instead a 
positive relationship (see Appendix E) 
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The aggregate data for the Euro Area and the European Union still 
mask, however, the different impact of the fiscal austerity on the Fi-
nal Consumption of each country and its weight on the aggregate: to 
get a clearer picture of the impact of the fiscal measures we make up 
a more specific comparison, focusing  on a sample of major Europe-
an countries for which we can assess more clearly the starting period 
of the fiscal austerity (to unbundle the different phases of the Great 
Crisis it is necessary to reconcile unemployment and consumption 
with the timing of the policy decisions: see Bellavite Pellegrini, 
Meoli, Pellegrini, Urga, 2013). 
The starting quarter of the austerity period for each major country 
was selected when the final consumption declined for at least four 
quarters in a row, while the ending period was the latest available da-
ta. The quarterly data selected are values in real volumes, adjusted 
for seasons and working days and the third column shows the esti-
mates of the consumption decline over the fiscal austerity period. 
The following columns show the difference in the quarterly con-
sumption – chain linked, base 2005 – between the first quarter of 
2008 and the latest available, for the second quarter of 2012.  The 
last column show the difference – annual data from 2008 until 2012, 
of the Final Consumption for the Euro Area countries, also in real 
volumes. 
The quarterly data for Greece are available only until the first quarter 
of 2011. Quarterly data and annual data are not strictly comparable 
because of the time pattern and the statistical adjustments for the 
quarterly data.   
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Table 4 
 
Country Fiscal 
Austerity 
Starting 
quarter 
Fiscal 
Austerity 
Latest 
quarter 
Fiscal 
austerity  
% real 
consumption 
Great Criis 
  real 
consumption 
2013-2 (-) 
2008-1 
(millions 
euro 
qtly ) 
Great Criis 
 real 
consumption 
   2012-2008 
(millions euro- 
year) 
Italy 2011-3 2013-2           -5,8        -18.557         -48.987 
Spain 2011-2 2013-2           -6,5        -15.662         -41.870 
Portugal 2011-1 2013-2         -11,3          -3.249         -10.594 
Ireland 2009-1 2013-2           -8,8          -3.198         -   9.725 
Greece 2010-1 2011-1         -10,0          -3.312         -39.342 
Cyprus 2012-2 2013-2           -7,1             -260          -     675 
Netherland 2011-2 2013-2           -3,1          -1.967          - 4.177 
Germany            26.920           86.214 
France            15.112           48.141 
Belgium              2.752             8.849 
Austria              2.018             6.686 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database. Greek data are unavailable 
after 2011-1.  
 
The table shows clearly the wide differences within the Euro Area 
and allows a different perspective on the two periods: Italy has been 
the country with the sharpest absolute value of final consumption de-
cline, both annually and quarterly, while Spain was only slightly be-
low. Greece, Portugal and Cyprus recorded the sharpest relative de-
cline: Netherland joined the group of the countries with consumption 
decline, even if with a smaller relative and absolute impact. The Euro 
Area, however, was not homogenous: Germany and France, and also 
Belgium and Austria with a lower volume, recorded a significant in-
crease of final consumption over the entire period of the Great Crisis, 
from 1998 to 2012. The divergent patter of consumption is coherent 
with the increasing variability of the unemployment rate inside the 
Euro Area and the European Union (figure 5): increasing unem-
ployment rate entails a decrease of final consumption (as a percent-
age of the previous year) on a quarterly basis for Italy, Spain, Portu-
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gal, Cyprus, and Netherland. In the case of Ireland the relationship is 
instead positive, i.e. an increasing unemployment rate is associated 
with a slowing decrease of consumption: the high unemployment 
benefit in Ireland, given a high involuntary unemployment, seems a 
plausibile explanation for this pattern.  We should expect, however, 
that the average consumption level  has a lower bound and cannot 
continue for ever. 
 
11. Final Consumption, Imports and Current Account 
 
The slump of domestic final consumption for the aforementioned 
countries brought about an improvement of the current account by 
shrinking import: exports recorded a low, but positive rate of growth 
and by the end of 2013 the current account balance improved and be-
came positive. 
 
                             (5’) 
 
We check the relationship Imports-Final Consumption for the Euro-
pean Union (27), which shows up more clearly on a time scale (tak-
ing care of a possible non coincident x axis): final consumption and 
imports growth rates took a simultaneous and sharp decline from 
2011Q2, final consumption decreased in a row since 2011Q4 until 
2013Q2, while imports declined from 2012Q1 to 2013Q2. Imports’ 
decline began in Spain and Portugal since 2010Q2, followed by Italy 
in 2010Q4 and France in 2011Q1, closely associated with a corre-
sponding decline of final consumption: final consumption declined 
continuously from 2011Q2 in Spain, 2011Q1 in Portugal, 2011Q3 in 
Italy. A profile of double-dip recession arises, with different ampli-
tude, for all these countries: economic crisis spread from Greece, to 
Spain and Portugal, to Italy and, to a minor extent, to France. 
 
 
 = ()
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The extension of the imports-final consumption relationship to the 
current account-final consumption at the level of European Union 
requires the small country assumption for the countries’ export, with 
the only exception of Germany:  a small country has no market pow-
er in the international trade, as it happens with the Germany’s export 
of cars in China. We analyze the relationship between the current ac-
count balance and the rates of change of the final consumption (over 
the corresponding period of the previous year) for the European Un-
ion: for each variable we take a three quarters moving average, there-
fore omitting the first and last quarters in the comparison of the two 
series, over the period from 2008Q1 to 2013Q3. Final consumption 
quarterly changes, year on year, have a clear impact on the current 
account of the European Union, which was slightly in deficit from 
2008Q2 until 2009Q2 and afterwards went positive and increasing, 
as a share of GDP. Final consumption changes fell sharply since 
2010Q4 and became negative since 2012Q1: correspondingly the 
current account surplus increased, reaching a maximum at the end of 
the period considered (figure 19).  
Italy and Spain were key for the aggregate dynamic of the European 
Union, because of their economic weight and their wide swings. In 
Italy the final consumption fell since 2010Q4 and became negative 
since 2011Q3 and continued its downward trend afterward: the cur-
rent account deficit followed suit, becoming rapidly positive. In 
Spain the reverse of the current account was more dramatic, starting 
from around 10% of the GDP at the beginning of 2008 and turning 
positive in the second quarter of 2012: the counterpart was a steady 
decline of final consumption for the entire period 2008Q1-2013Q3, 
except for 3 quarters. The case of Portugal is a mixture of the pat-
terns in Italy and Spain: it started from an even higher current ac-
count deficit at the beginning of the period, the final consumption 
showed a double-dip becoming (again) negative in 2011Q1 and the 
current account reached the balance at the beginning of 2013. It is 
worth considering the parallel experience of France and Germany: 
France recorded a slight decrease of final consumption only in the 
fourth quarters of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012, while the cur-
rent account deficit remained negative but stable: in Germany the fi-
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nal consumption was steadily increasing, except for one quarter: the 
current account was positive at a high level (as a share of GDP) and 
from the 5,8% in 2011Q2 increased to 7,2% in 2013Q1 (moving av-
erage values) (see Appendix F).  
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12. Internal devaluation and inflation rates differentials 
 
The convergence of “prices and quantities” among the European 
countries is the main economic and political goal: a steady diver-
gence of inflation between countries with a common currency cannot 
be sustained in the long run, because it is the cause of structural im-
balances which need to be removed. Inside the member of the Euro 
Area the key magnitude  becomes the real effective exchange rate 
(REER), which, for two countries, can be reduced to the bilateral dif-
ference of the inflation rates: 
 
                        (8) 
 
The real Italian/Germany exchange rate can be defined as the ratio 
between the Italian and the German price level of a given basket (de-
pending on which is the foreign country), while (in our notation) the 
real change is the difference between the Italian and the German in-
flation rates. If the inflation rate in Italy is higher than the inflation 
rate in Germany, say +10%, a given basket will cost 10% more to the 
Italian consumers and the real exchange rate will increases +10%, 
that is a real exchange depreciation for the Italian Euro. On the other 
side the German people going to Italy on vacation should find out 
that goods and services are 10% less expensive than in Germany, a 
real appreciation. If we start with the same wage level, a 10% infla-
tion gap would give to the German workers a larger purchasing pow-
er. Indeed the hourly wage levels in Germany are already higher than 
in Italy: in 2012 the hourly labour cost were 35,4 euro in Germany 
industry (27,3 in Italy), 24,7 in construction (25,6 in Italy) and 28,4 
in services (27,3 in Italy). Because for a consumer a lower price is 
better than a higher price, for the same good, we should expect a cor-
rection through some form of competition or arbitrage, as it happens 
when on vacation or with cross-border shopping. A common curren-
cy area is optimal if arbitrage is allowed and feasible for goods, labor 
and capital: to achieve this goal appropriates rules and institutions 
are required, but unfortunately they are still uncomplete in the Euro 
 = ̇ −  ̇
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Area, where the issue is now vital because its members gave up the 
instrument of external devalution, and is anyway crucial for the other 
European Union countries, which can still retain the instrument. 
As an example for the goods markets we compare the price index of 
Italy and France, with Germany as a benchmark, because its inflation 
rate has been the lowest in the period 1999-2012. Italy’s rate of infla-
tion was always higher with respect to Germany (except in 2007): 
France had also a higher rate of inflation with respect to Germany 
(except 2001, 2007 and 2009) but always lower with respect to Italy 
(except 2010). As as consequence, between 1999 and 2012 inflation 
increased +24,6% in Germany, +28% in France and +36% in Italy 
(figure 20): on average +1% each year, considering Italy versus 
Germany, and +0,7% taking Italy versus France.  The long term con-
sequence of a steady inflation divergence is a growing loss of Italy’s 
competitiveness, implying an increasing real exchange rate, and an 
increasing current account deficit: while external depreciation is the 
instrument to restore the balance of the current account with a system 
a floating exchange rate, with a common currency a possible instru-
ment is the internal devalutation, which implies an array of changes, 
like freezing wages and salaries, removing indexation or a 
straighforward reduction of wages and prices. 
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Relying on the instrument of internal devalutation the IMF makes 
two specific policy recommendation: “(1) a fall in the price of  non 
tradable goods relative to tradable goods to help reorient domestic 
production towards tradable; and (2) a decline in the price of domes-
tic tradable goods relative to foreign tradable goods to help boost ex-
ternal competitiveness and exports. In other words, a relative price 
adjustment with respect to trading partner would bolster the competi-
tiveness of the external sector (external balance), while the realloca-
tion of resources from the non tradable to the stronger tradable sec-
tors would stimulate the overall economy to help it to reach full em-
ployment (internal balance)” (IMF, World Economic Outlook, Octo-
ber 2013, p. 45). Indeed, since the pioneering analysis by Swan 
(1955) and Salter (1959), external devaluation (expenditure switch-
ing) can be an effective instrument to bring back to balance the cur-
rent account only if it is well coupled with an “absorption” policy 
(expenditure-changing), i.e. a demand reduction which can be ac-
complished throught a thightening of fiscal and monetary policy. The 
appropriate balance between the two instruments is crucial to achieve 
both internal and external balance: however, as Salter already point-
ed many years ago, with the internal devalutation the adjustment 
process would be “painful” and correspondigly high the chance of 
settling down in the “unhappy” situation of high unemployment (like 
Spain or Italy), for an exceedingly long period, and an inflation rate 
which is “too” low, trying to catch up and overdo the already low in-
flation in Germany. A currency union, in which the current account 
of each country matters, requires a long run convergence of inflation 
rates: however this could prove to be a structural problem for coun-
tries with a low GDP per capita, needing to converge at a faster 
speed of GDP and a higher rate of inflation. In the short run the re-
duction of the inflation gap with respect to Germany is on this way 
since the summer 2013 in Italy, after a prolonged contraction in con-
sumption, while it is close to zero in Portugal, Ireland, Spain and 
records an outright deflation in Greece: in fact the European price 
index measure prices at their nominal value and does not take ac-
count of recurring on and off discounts, except for the seasonal: 
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therefore the discounted price inflation at the end of 2013 is probably 
negative also for the other countries.  
Krugman (2012) suggests three fixes, in an attempt of not wasting 
the European Union project: Europe-wide backing of banks, the ECB 
as lender of last resort and a higher inflation target; for countries like 
Italy and Spain, in the light of the previous analysis, we suggest also 
an industrial and competitive policy aimed at removing inefficien-
cies, rather than cutting wages and purchasing power. The previous 
comparison between Italy and Germany, extended to the main sub-
categories of individual consumption by purpose (COICOP), allows 
a better understanding of the wide scope of an industrial policy. We 
consider first a subcategory which can be broadly classified as non 
tradeable, i.e. expenditure for housing, water, electricity, gas and 
other fuel, whose share of households consumers’ expenditures is 
24% in Germany and 11% in Italy. Inflation between 1999 and 2012 
was +39% in Germany and +60% in Italy, therefore widening the in-
flationary gap from 11 point to 21 points (figure 21). 
If we consider, to the opposite, a category which can be broadly 
called as tradeable, i.e. the category of transport, which is made up of 
purchase of vehicles, motor cars, motor cycle, spare parts, fuel, 
maintenance, transport by railway, road, air and sea, the inflationary 
gap Italy-Germany shrinks to 10 points in 2012, while until 2010 is 
the same as France and  Germany (figure 22). The share of transport 
is 16% of total households expenditures in Italy, 17% in France and 
14% in Germany. 
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The third group is made up of quasi-tradable goods, under the head-
ing of food and non-alcoholic beverages (bread, meat, fish, milk, 
oils, fruit, vegetables, sugar): “quasi” because the goods are perisha-
ble and the opportunity of export are  therefore more limited, but still 
possible with low cost of rapid transport.  The share of food and non-
alcholic beverages is 17% of total households expenditures in Italy, 
16% in France and 12% in Germany, while the inflationary gap be-
tween Italy and Germany is 13 points, the same as the average.  It 
seems therefore that, rather then prompting a deflation on purchasing 
power and consumption, it is possible: a) to modify relative prices 
improving efficiency in the goods market, targeting the construction 
sector, to avoid booms and bust, like in Spain and Ireland, with the 
consequence of rising rents and b) shortening the goods supply 
chain, like food, delivered domestically and  exported to the closer 
countries, because the longer is the chain the higher is the inflation 
multiplier. 
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13. The Germany-China Syndrome: Dissecting Germany’s interna-
tional trade 
 
The growing current account surplus of Germany has been analyzed 
by few contributions, aimed at explaining the underlying causes and 
consequences on other EU members: an interesting result (Kollman 
et al. 2013) using a DSGE model is the high elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and imported products (3.0) in Germany, which 
can help to explain the diverging pattern of the sharp increase of ex-
ports with China, while the trade balance has been positive only in 
the most recent years. The Germany’s economic imbalance in Eu-
rope is causing concerns also in the US, where the Department of 
Treasury has pointed out that “Germany has maintained a large cur-
rent account surplus throughout the euro financial crisis, and in 2012, 
Germany’s nominal current account surplus was larger than that of 
China” and as consequence “The net result has been a deflationary 
bias for the euro area, as well as for the world economy” (2013, p. 
25). It was not always this way.  
Germany’s economic growth in the first decade of 2000 was driven 
by the exports, whose share of GDP was 33% in 2000, a bit higher 
than in Italy, with 27%: from the 2000 to 2012 the share of export on 
GDP jumped to 52% in Germany and increased slightly to 30% in 
Italy (figure 24): a positive relationship exists between Germany’s 
exports, as a share of GDP, and the external balance of goods and 
services, as a share of GDP. To explain this structural change we 
need to consider that over the year 2000 two fundamental events 
happened, with profound and lasting consequences: the onset of the 
European Monetary Union, in 1999, and  the entry of China in the 
WTO in December 2011. The eruption of the Great Recession, in 
2008 was the origin of  a new wave of structural changes on the Eu-
ropean economy, leaded by Germany, whose intra-EU(27) trade bal-
ance peaked in 2007, and then dropped from 126 billions to around 
43 billions in 2013: at the same time the extra-UE(27) trade jumped 
from 72 billions in 2007 to 152 billion in 2013 (figure 25 - 2013 is 
our estimate). 
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The reversal of trade flows signals a tilt of the Germany exports and 
imports outside the European Union and helps to explain why Ger-
many went through the European recession, together with its ge-
ograpical closer countries, without the economic losses which bur-
dened Southern European countries.  
Considering the Germany’s trade balance, ranked by value of the 
more important partners and for selected years, we can appreciate the 
above mentioned statement by the US Department of Treasury: Unit-
ed States is the country which has secured to Germany the largest 
and increasing trade balance since the 2000 and therefore provided a 
sizable share contribution to its high and growing current account 
surplus:France and United Kingdom follow suit with the same pat-
tern. The Germany trade balance is also in surplus with respect to the 
boundary countries like Austria, Denmark, Poland and Sweden: 
Germany’s has also close connections with The Netherland, record-
ing however a sizable negative deficit, mainly due to the imports of 
mineral fuels (19 billions), energy machinery (3 billions), iron, steel 
and aluminium products (3 billions).  However Germany records a 
substantial trade surplus with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia, both totalling a trade surplus of almost 17 billions. Germa-
ny’s surplus with Italy and Spain peaked in 2007, then plunging back 
in 2013, down to a level lower than in 2000. Regarding Asian coun-
tries, Germany records a surplus with South-Korea, Hong Kong,  
Singapore, India, Japan: it come as a surprise that, in spite of the 
sharp increase of exports to China (from 10 billions in 2000 to more 
than 60 billion in 2013), the trade balance has become positive only 
since 2011 (partly because of a decrease in imports from China). Ob-
viously the reason is that, in the meantime, Germany’s imports from 
China have increased simultaneously: to understand causes and con-
sequences of this structural change we need a closer scrutiny of the 
pattern of trade between Germany and China. Germany’s trade pat-
tern is simultaneously intraindustry and interindustry, reflecting 
comparative advantages and natural endowments: standard economic 
theory (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009) helps to explain the pattern of 
interindustry trade, between Germany, which exports to China capi-
tal-abundant products (like vehicles and pharmaceutical product), 
  
 
60
and imports from China, labor-intensive goods (like textiles and 
footwear).   As China is continuing its growth and the internal mar-
ket becomes evolute, product differention grows and with it intrain-
dustry trade, prompted by the huge size of its domestic demand. The 
following analysis focuses on the structure of imports by main prod-
uct, trying to detect the possible effects of Germany’s import growth 
on other European countries. 
 
Table 5 
 
 GERMANY'S TRADE BALANCE 
Country/Year 2013 2007 2000
UNITED STATES 51.016 38.226 22.716
FRANCE 33.607 27.010 15.570
UNITED KINGDOM 30.758 27.637 12.430
AUSTRIA 17.195 18.985 11.149
ARAB EMIRATES 8.943 5.385 1.944
CHINA 8.369 -18.873 -7.666
SAUDI ARABIA 7.579 4.423 1.598
KOREA (South) 7.533 -1.027 -1.000
SPAIN 7.527 27.199 11.060
SWEDEN 7.214 7.714 3.639
ITALY 6.213 19.601 9.602
BRAZIL 5.626 625 1.987
POLAND 4.898 11.942 2.713
DENMARK 4.832 3.325 299
HON KONG 4.214 2.703 1.896
SINGAPORE 3.890 2.451 704
INDIA 3.413 2.966 -213
JAPAN 2.185 -5.353 -10.347
RUSSIAN FEDER. -1.329 437 -7.603
NETHERLAND -55.237 -29.410 -21.843
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database (2013 our estimate) 
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Germany’s imports from China are spread on all the industries, but 
are also highly concentrated in few products: four products makes 
more than half of the imports’ increase between 2012 and 2000 and 
the products selected represent 85% of Germany’s total imports from 
China. Germany has a deficit trade balance for almost all the prod-
ucts selected, with the exception of the vehicles, optical and pho-
tograpic, boiler and appliances and plastic, for which Germany rec-
ords a positive surplus: the products with only a negative deficit total 
17,8 billions (2012), while the products with positive surplus and 
miscellaneous product total 23,4 billion, for a positive (estimated) 
balance of 5,5 billions. 
 The question is whether the increased import competition, derived 
by the increasing imports  in Germany from China, produced adverse 
economic effects in Europe. This is what has happened in the US, 
causing higher unemployment and prompting a decline in US manu-
facturing employment (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013): in Germany 
import competition takes the form of a change in the global value 
chain, with China imports competing also with other European man-
ufacturers, supplying the German consumer market as well as the 
German factories.  
For the previous selection of products we compared Germany’s im-
ports from China with the Germany’s imports from Italy and the US 
in the period 2012-2000: the results are that the corresponding US 
imports decreased for almost all the products, while Italy retained a 
positive surplus for appliances but decreased its exports to Germany 
for the article of apparel. For both countries there was therefore some 
import substitution.  
The economic benefit of the increasing Germany’s import-export 
with China has to be evaluated in relation to the global chain value 
and the terms of trade: we look therefore at the average value per 
chilogram of the imports and exports of Germany with China, com-
paring it with the corresponding average values of Italy’s imports 
and exports with China. We find that the Germany’s average value of 
exports to China has steadily increased from 2000 to 2012, while the 
average value of Italian exports declined from 2001 to 2003 and then 
remained stable. The average value of Germany’s imports from Chi-
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na has also increased, in line with the average value of exports: since 
2009 the Germany terms of trade improved while in Italy worsened 
along with an increase of average value of imports from China (fig-
ure  27). The  question is whether this argument can provide a policy 
indication for economic growth, because a high average value for a 
product, net of imported inputs, means a high value added. Germa-
ny’s trade with China is characterized by a high average value, like 
for the exports of vehicles and pharmaceutical products, reflecting a 
high value added and quality of the products exported: quality is a 
matter of size only if it implies a significant investment in Research 
and Development, while the size of China market offers ample op-
portunities also for smaller countries targeting diversified market 
segments with high value added.  
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14. GDP per capita and population 
 
The GDP per capita, partial measure of the standard of living, is cal-
culated as the ratio between the real GDP (chain-linked with 2005 as 
reference year) and the population, whose measurement however can 
be difficult when migrations flows, inward and outward, becomes 
significant or the demography is evolving very rapidly. Both factors, 
migrations and demography, played a well recognizable role during 
the Great European Recession.  Therefore it is useful to analyze the 
different movements of the numerator and denominator (in the case 
of Italy we considered the most recent data on population rebased af-
ter the 2011 Census).   
Relative to the size of the resident population in 2011, Luxembourg 
recorded the highest number of immigrants, followed by Cyprus and 
Malta, while the highest rates of emigration were reported for Ireland 
and Lithuania. In Ireland, Spain and Poland, natural increase was the 
driver of population growth, while net migration was negative, espe-
cially in Ireland. During the Great Recession population decrease 
was driven jointly by natural change and negative net migration: in 
2011 a negative total population change was reported by eight EU 
members States and Croatia. In most cases, this was mainly due to 
negative net migration (Latvia, Lithuania Greece, Portugal) supple-
mented by negative natural change. Conversely, the population de-
crease was mostly driven by negative natural change in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia, supplemented by negative net migration. In 
Estonia and Hungary the population decline decrease was due solely 
to negative natural change, which offset positive net migration (Eu-
ropean Union, 2013). Table 7 summarizes these results, showing 
population in 2012 and its total change between 2008 and 2012.  
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Germany is worth to notice, because its population, after reaching a 
peak of 82,5 millions in 2003, steadily declined to 81,8 in 2012, in 
spite of the increasing number of immigrants in 2011 and 2012, 
when the balance between arrivals and departures from negative be-
came positive reaching 279 and 369 thousand immigrants (DESTA-
TIS). To the opposite, the population increase in France is full driven 
by natural change, while the UK population increase is the joint re-
sult of a positive natural change and a positive inflow of net migra-
tion, underlying the economic attraction the UK economy. Italy, in-
stead, records a steady negative natural change, fully compensated – 
at least until 2012 - by a positive inflow of net migration, which 
however cannot compensate the generational decline of the 20-39 
years cohort.  
With these caveats, we can calculate the GDP per capita, which we 
rank, in table 8, in ascending order of the rate of growth between 
2008 and 2012 for each country, looking more precisely to which 
countries lost ground, which improved, and the related order of mag-
nitude. Setting aside the Luxembourg, which recorded the highest 
flow of immigrants (relative to the residents), France, whose slight 
decline is coupled with a significant natural increase and UK which 
recorded both a natural increase and a significant inflow of immi-
grants, all the other countries – in the table 8, up to Romania - lost 
definitely ground in terms of GDP per capita. The main group of 
countries which went through the Great European Crisis without  
suffering economic and social scars is made of Germany, Poland, 
Sweden, Austria, Slovakia, and also Lithuania Estonia and Malta: the 
overlapping with the aggregate values of table 1 is wide but incom-
plete. For a complete coverage we need to add France and Belgium , 
whose population recorded a substantial increase (France for natural 
change and Belgium for net positive migration and natural change)  – 
and as a consequence the GDP per capita declined while the total 
GDP increased - and exclude Lithuania, whose population instead 
declined markedly (both for negative net migration and negative nat-
ural change) and therefore the GDP per capita increased, as did also 
the total GDP. 
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Conclusions 
 
The Great Recession hit Europe twice: the first time through the ex-
ogenous shock of the US crisis and the second time as a consequence 
of the fiscal consolidation and internal devaluation policies imple-
mented to face the Sovereign Debt Crisis. The crucial divide, which 
followed, is the diverging path of countries with increasing unem-
ployment rates and countries with decreasing unemployment rates, 
while instead the inflation rates are uniformly converging to a worri-
some low level. Half of the European population lost ground while 
the other half improved their standard of living: the economic divide 
should be removed befor putting at risk the social coesion of the Eu-
ropean Union.  Our attempt to unbundle the European crisis focuses 
on five key aggregates: unemployment, consumption, investment, 
inflation and current account. The empirical evidence supports a 
chain of causation which starts with the shock of fiscal consolidation 
and internal devaluation, which decreases domestic final consump-
tion, prompts a fall in investment and the increases of unemploy-
ment, coupled with a drop of inflation; the falling domestic demand 
curtails imports and, given stable or increasing exports, improves the 
current account and brings it to balance. The restraint of consump-
tion, through the fiscal consolidation and internal devaluation, has 
been a success in rebalancing the current account and has partially 
achieved the goal of reducing the public deficit. The downside is the 
toll of a deep economic recession and increasing unemployment, 
while inflation rate has fallen below 1%, sparking fears of deflation. 
It is well known that the Euro Area is not an optimal currency area, 
but internal devalution has proved to be the problem, rather than the 
solution, because it is a very imperfect substitute of currency devalu-
tation. The strenght of economic ties with China and Asian countries, 
added to the US, helped Germany and the closer countries to go 
through the recession without economic losses, but tilted Germany’s 
economic interests outside the European Union and prompted a leap 
of the export, as a share of GDP. However it is not clear how sus-
tainable can be an export led pattern of growth for a country with the 
size of Germany, when the export of good and services, as a share of 
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GDP, is so higher than US, Japan and China. The crucial issue is that 
the Southern European countries have definitely shrinked the size of 
their economies and the question is how long it will take for their 
standard of living to return to the pre-crisis level and if this goal can 
be achieved without renewed imbalances.    
 
  
 
71
 
References 
 
D. H. Autor, D. Dorn, and G. H. Hanson (2013), The Chinese Syn-
drome: Local Market Effects of Import Competition in the United 
States, American Economic Review, 103(6), 2121-2168. 
 
C. Bellavite Pellegrini, M. Meoli, L. Pellegrini, G. Urga (2013), In-
terconnectedness and Systemic Risk of the European Banks 2006-
2012, mimeo. 
 
L. Bonatti , A. Fracasso (2012), The Costs of Rebalancing the China-
US co-dependency, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, 120 
(1), 59-105. 
 
L. Campiglio (2012), Europa, crescita e sostenibilità: “e pluribus 
unum” ? Istituto di Politica Economica, Quaderno n.59, febbraio, 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano. 
 
L. Campiglio (2013), Welfare state, family and market’s SINS in the 
EU, International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de So-
ciologie, 23:3, 522-541. 
 
R. Caruso, (2012), “Differentials in Property Rights in a two-sector 
Economy”, Revue d’Economie Politique, 122 (2), 257-278. 
 
R. Clower (1965), “The Keynesian Counter-revolution: A Theoreti-
cal Appraisal”, in F. H. Hahn and F. P. R. Brechling (eds.) “The 
Theory of Interests Rates”, Macmillan, London. 
 
European Commission (2013), Shadow economy and Undeclared 
Work, Bruxelles. 
 
European Commission (2013) EU Employment and Social Situation. 
Special Supplement on Demographic Trends, March, Eurostat. 
 
  
 
72
IMF (2013), “World Economic Outlook”, Washington, DC. 
 
E. Knotek II (2007), How useful is Okun’s Law ? Economic Review, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Fourth Quarterly, 73-102. 
 
R. Kollman, M. Ratto, W. Roeger, J. In’t Veld and L. Vogel (2013), 
What Drives the German current account ? And how does it affect 
other EU member states ? Economic Policy, forthcoming. 
 
P. Krugman and M. Obstfeld (2009), International Economics, Pear-
son International edition, London. 
 
P. Krugman (2012), Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area, New 
York Times, June 24, 2012. 
 
R.G. Lipsey (1960), The Relationship Between Unemployment and 
the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the UK, 1862-1957: A 
Further Analysis, Economica, 27, (105), 1-31. 
 
A. Okun (1962), Potential GNP: Its Measurement and Significance, 
Cowles Foundation Paper, 1962 Proceedings of the Business and 
Economics Statistical Section of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, Yale New Haven, 283-299. 
 
G. Quaas and M. Klein (2010), Cluster and Loops of German Phil-
lips Curve, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA Paper no. 
23094, june. Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23094/. 
 
U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of International Affairs (2013), 
Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate 
Policies, October 30, Washington. 
 
P. Samuelson and R. Solow (1960), The Problem of Achieving and 
Maintaining a Stable Price Level: Analytical Aspects of Anti-
Inflation Policy, American Economic Review Paper and Proceed-
ings, 50(2), 177-194. 
  
 
73
 
W. Salter (1959), Internal and External Balance: The Role of Price 
and Expenditure Effects, Economic Record, 1, 35, 226-238. 
 
T. Swan (1955), Longer-Run Problems of the Balance of Payments, 
in H. W. Arndt and M. W. Corden (eds.) The Australian Economy: A 
Volume of Readings, Chesire Press, Melbourne,  384-395. 
 
F. Vito (2011), World Depression and the Crises of Economic Theo-
ry, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, 119 (3-4), 349-356. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
74
 
 
 
Elenco 
Quaderni già pubblicati 
 
 
 
1. Capitalismo senza capitale. Il capitalismo italiano delle diversi-
tà. L. Campiglio, luglio 1993. 
2. Credibility and Populism in the Management of a Public Social 
Security System. L. Bonatti, luglio 1993. 
3. Il ruolo delle Nonprofit Organizations nella produzione di ser-
vizi sanitari. R. Creatini, dicembre 1993. 
4. Technological Change, Diffusion and Output Growth. M. 
Baussola, dicembre 1993. 
5. Europe: the Trademark is Still on the Mark. L. Campiglio, gen-
naio 1994. 
6. A Cointegration Approach to the Monetary Model of the Ex-
change Rate. M. Arnone, febbraio 1994. 
7. Gli effetti del debito pubblico quando la ricchezza è un fine e 
non solo un mezzo. V. Moramarco, maggio 1994. 
8. Emissioni inquinanti, asimmetria informativa ed efficacia delle 
imposte correttive. R. Creatini, settembre 1994. 
9. La disoccupazione in Europa. L. Campiglio, novembre 1994. 
10. The Economics of Voting and Non-Voting: Democracy and 
Economic Efficiency. L. Campiglio, gennaio 1995. 
11. The Banking Law and its Influence on the Evolution of the Ital-
ian Financial System. C. Bellavite Pellegrini, maggio 1995. 
12. Monetary Authorities, Economic Policy and Influences in the 
Capital Market in Italy 1960-1982. C. Bellavite Pellegrini, 
giugno 1995. 
13. A General Model to Study Alternative Approaches to Econo-
mywide Models in a Transaction Values (TV) Context. F. Tim-
pano, giugno 1995. 
  
 
75
14. Economia legale ed economia illegale: schemi interpretativi 
della coesistenza. D. Marino, F. Timpano, luglio 1995. 
15. Il problema del cambiamento dei coefficienti nel contesto di una 
matrice di contabilità sociale regionalizzata. F. Timpano, set-
tembre 1995. 
16. La dimensione transnazionale dell’inquinamento marino: le 
convenzioni internazionali tra teoria e pratica. G. Malerba, giu-
gno 1996. 
17. Efficienza, stabilità degli intermediari e crescita del reddito: un 
modello teorico. C. Bellavite Pellegrini, novembre 1996. 
18. Innovation and the World Economy: How will our (Grand) 
Children Earn a Living?, L. Campiglio, P. J. Hammond, gen-
naio 1997. 
19. Evaluating Private Intergenerational Transfers between House-
holds. The Case of Italy. F. Tartamella, febbraio 1997. 
20. Qualità e regolamentazione. R. Creatini, maggio 1997. 
21. Wage Differentials, the Profit-Wage Relationship and the Mini-
mum Wage. G. Quintini, giugno 1997. 
22. Potere e rappresentatività nel Parlamento Italiano: una pro-
spettiva economica. L. Campiglio, luglio 1997. 
23. Exchange Rate, Herd Behaviour and Multiple Equilibria. M. 
Arnone, settembre 1997. 
24. Rank, Stock, Order and Epidemic Effects in the Diffusion of 
New Technologies in Italian Manufacturing Industries. E. Bar-
toloni, M. Baussola, dicembre 1997. 
25. Stabilità ed Efficienza del Sistema Finanziario Italiano: una Ve-
rifica Empirica. M. Manera, C. Bellavite Pellegrini, gennaio 
1998. 
26. Endogenous Uncertainty and Market Volatility. M. Kurz, M. 
Motolese, aprile 1999. 
27. Famiglia, distribuzione del reddito e politiche familiari: una 
survey della letteratura degli anni Novanta. Parte prima: I nuo-
vi fenomeni e i vecchi squilibri delle politiche sociali. G. Maler-
ba, aprile 2000. 
  
 
76
28. Modelli di Agenzie di sviluppo regionale: analisi teorica ed evi-
denza empirica. M. Arnone, C. Bellavite Pellegrini, F. Timpano, 
aprile 2000. 
29. Endogenous Uncertainty and the Non-neutrality of Money. M. 
Motolese, maggio 2000. 
30. Growth, Persistent Regional Disparities and Monetary Policy in 
a Model with Imperfect Labor Markets. L. Bonatti, maggio 
2001. 
31. Two Arguments against the Effectiveness of Mandatory Reduc-
tions in the Workweek as a Job Creation Policy. L. Bonatti, 
maggio 2001. 
32. Growth and Employment Differentials under Alternative Wage-
Setting Institutions and Integrated Capital Markets. L. Bonatti, 
maggio 2001. 
33. Attività innovativa e spillovers tecnologici: una rassegna dell'a-
nalisi teorica. A. Guarino, maggio 2001. 
34. Famiglia, distribuzione del reddito e politiche familiari: una 
survey della letteratura italiana degli anni Novanta. Parte se-
conda: La riforma del Welfare e le sue contraddizioni. G. Ma-
lerba, giugno 2001. 
35. Changeover e inflazione a Milano. L. Campiglio, V. Negri, giu-
gno 2002. 
36. Prezzi e inflazione nel mercato dell’auto in Italia. L. Campiglio, 
A. Longhi, ottobre 2002. 
37. Interessi economici, potere politico e rappresentanza parlamen-
tare in Italia nel periodo 1948-2002. L. Campiglio, F. Lipari, 
maggio 2003. 
38. Dai consumi interni a quelli dei residenti: una stima prelimina-
re a livello regionale. C. Corea, giugno 2003. 
39. Studio delle relazioni tra spesa familiare e caratteri sociali, de-
mografici ed economici delle famiglie italiane: un’analisi a li-
vello sub-nazionale. A. Coli, giugno 2003. 
40. L’utilizzo delle indagini su redditi e consumi nella derivazione 
di indicatori per scomporre i dati di Contabilità Nazionale. Un 
caso riferito all’analisi regionale. F. Tartamella, giugno 2003. 
  
 
77
41. Segnali di disagio economico nel tenore di vita delle famiglie 
italiane: un confronto tra regioni. G. Malerba, S. Platoni, luglio 
2003. 
42. Rational Overconfidence and Excess Volatility in General Equi-
librium. C.K. Nielsen, febbraio 2004. 
43. How Ethnic Fragmentation And Cultural Distance Affect Moral 
Hazard in Developing Countries: a Theoretical Analysis. T. 
Gabrieli, febbraio 2004. 
44. Industrial Agglomeration: Economic Geography, Techno-
logical Spillover, and Policy incentives. E. Bracco, ottobre 
2005. 
45. An Introduction to the Economics of Conflict, a Survey of Theo-
retical Economic Models of Conflict. R. Caruso, ottobre 2005. 
46. A Model of Conflict with Institutional Constraint in a two-
period Setting. What is a Credible Grant?, R. Caruso, ottobre 
2005. 
47. On the Concept of Administered Prices. L. Gattini, dicembre 
2005. 
48. Architecture of Financial Supervisory Authorities and the Basel 
Core Principles. M. Arnone, A. Gambini, marzo 2006. 
49. Optimal Economic Institutions Under Rational Overconfidence. 
With applications to The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and 
the Design of Social Security. C.K. Nielsen, aprile 2006. 
50. Indicatori di vulnerabilità economica nelle regioni italiane: 
un’analisi dei bilanci familiari. G. Malerba, giugno 2006. 
51. Risk Premia, Diverse Beliefs and Beauty Contests. M. Kurz, M. 
Motolese, gennaio 2007. 
52. Le disuguaglianze regionali nella distribuzione del reddito. Par-
te prima: Un’analisi della povertà delle famiglie italiane. G. 
Malerba, dicembre 2009. 
53. What do we know about the link between growth and institu-
tions?, M. Spreafico, maggio 2010. 
54. Economic Institutions and Economic Growth in the Former So-
viet Union Economies. M. Spreafico, maggio 2010. 
55. Famiglia, figli e sviluppo sostenibile. L. Campiglio, settembre 
2011. 
  
 
78
56. Le determinanti politico-economiche della distribuzione inter-
regionale della spesa pubblica. V. Moramarco, ottobre 2011. 
57. Le disuguaglianze regionali nella distribuzione del reddito. Par-
te seconda: Un’analisi delle famiglie italiane a rischio di pover-
tà. G. Malerba, ottobre 2011. 
58. Libertà del vivere una vita civile e deprivazione economica. L. 
Campiglio, ottobre 2011. 
59. Europa, crescita e sostenibilità: “E Pluribus Unum”. L. Cam-
piglio, Vita e Pensiero, febbraio 2012 (ISBN 978-88-343-2215-
4). 
60. Market’s SINS and the European Welfare State: theory and em-
pirical evidences. L. Campiglio, Vita e Pensiero, settembre 2012 
(ISBN 978-88-343-2323-6). 
61. Brutality of Jihadist Terrorism. A contest theory perspective and 
empirical evidence in the period 2002-2010. R. Caruso, F. 
Schneider, Vita e Pensiero, ottobre 2012 (ISBN 978-88-343-
2360-1). 
62. Hooliganism and demand for football in Italy. Evidence for the 
period 1962-2011. R. Caruso, M. di Domizio, Vita e Pensiero, 
novembre 2012 (ISBN 978-88-343-2368-7). 
63. Why Italy’s saving rate became (so) low?, L. Campiglio, Vita e 
Pensiero, febbraio 2013 (ISBN 978-88-343-2500-1). 
64. Institutions, the resource curse and the transition economies: 
further evidence, M. Spreafico, Vita e Pensiero, aprile 2013 
(ISBN 978-88-343-2551-3). 
65. Income inequality in the European Union: evidence from a pa-
nel analysis, G. Malerba, M. Spreafico, Vita e Pensiero, aprile 
2013 (ISBN 978-88-343-2553-7). 
66. Can only democracies enhance “Human Development”? Evi-
dence from the Former Soviet Countries, J. S L McCombie, M. 
Spreafico, Vita e Pensiero, aprile 2013 (ISBN 978-88-343-
2554-4). 
67. Unbundling the Great European Recession (2009-2013): Un-
employment, Consumption, Investment, Inflation and Current 
Account, L. Campiglio, Vita e Pensiero, giugno 2014(ISBN 
978-88-343-2835-4). 
  
 
79
 
  
 
80
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Printed by 
Gi&Gi srl - Triuggio (MB)  
June 2014 
ISTITUTO DI POLITICA ECONOMICA 
Unbundling the Great European
Recession (2009-2013): Unemployment,
Consumption, Investment, Inflation 
and Current Account 
Luigi Campiglio
Quaderno n. 67/gennaio 2014
COP Campiglio 67.qxd:_  29/05/14  11:40  Page 1
